Hostages
Last updated:1 March 9, 2025
On October 7, 2023 Hamas and several other Palestinian militant groups captured 251 hostages and took them to the Gaza Strip,2 where two Israeli civilian hostages and two corpses of IDF soldiers had been held since 2014 and 2015.3 The hostages included Israeli citizens, Israeli soldiers, foreign workers who came to Israel and other foreigners.4 More than half had foreign passports, from 25 countries.5 Some of the hostages were captured alive, of whom some were injured, and some were already dead.6 Hamas’ official narrative states that taking Israeli soldiers as hostages/prisoners of war was central to their plans on October 7.7 On the day of the attack, the then-deputy chairman of Hamas’ Political Bureau suggested the same when stating on Al Jazeera that “what we have in our hands will liberate all our prisoners”.8 Footage reveals that the hostage-taking was highly coordinated and that several militant Palestinian groups participated. Within this context, therefore, hostage-taking – the imprisonment of civilians in violation of fundamental rules of international law – is a war crime and crime against humanity.9 Accordingly, hostage-taking was one of the charges the ICC advanced against three Hamas leaders.10
Over the past few decades, Israel conducted several exchange deals in which it traded Palestinian and Lebanese captives for its own captured citizens. Israel always released more captives than its interlocutor. The ratio increased over time, reaching a high of 1,027 prisoners released in 2011 to free a single IDF soldier, Gilad Shalit.11 Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’s leader in the Gaza Strip on October 2023, and the reported mastermind behind the October 7 attack, was one of the Palestinian prisoners released in that deal.12
As October 7 completely surprised Israel, it took time to gather the human remains and forensic evidence from the various sites that were attacked, including at the Nova festival, the roads outside the Gaza Strip, the kibbutzim and other settlements.13 The evidence was analyzed in a dedicated center for identifying those killed and those taken hostage. The process took days to weeks, and during that time many families remained uncertain about the fate of their loved ones.14
Already from the first days and weeks after October 7, existing civil society groups offered various services, while others developed organically, for example to represent the families of the hostages as support and advocacy groups. Especially in the early period of the war, civil society groups, together with the hostage families, were effective in raising awareness about the hostages in the international sphere. For example, they created standardized visual material for dissemination around the world, and organized awareness-raising events in Israel, including demonstrations, encampments, and the designation of public spaces for commemoration.15
The administrative and bureaucratic institutions of the state remained uninvolved for weeks, and families of hostages repeatedly stated that no state official had spoken to them.16 The lack of state involvement on the ground contrasted with the state’s use of the hostages in the international sphere. Accordingly, the hostages featured in Israel’s official messages shortly after October 7, and releasing the hostages was quickly proclaimed a major objective of Israel’s war on Gaza.17 The return of the hostages remained a proclaimed war goal by mid-January 2025, leading to the second ceasefire agreement.18
Evidence from the hostages released during the second ceasefire agreement reveals the harsh conditions in which they were held.19 Many of these conditions were known to Israeli officials,20 also based on the experiences of hostages released in the first deal.21 Some hostages were held underground for most of their time in Gaza (some 500 days).22 One noted that he took a shower only once every several months and was barefoot most of the time.23 Another noted that he underwent a medical operation without anesthesia.24 One said his legs remained in chains for over a year.25 Some hostages were moved frequently – one reported 33 such moves between places in Gaza.26 Some reported physical and psychological torture.27 Many reported the lack of food,28 although some hostages received additional food before their release.29 Many reported the danger they experienced from Israeli attacks.30 Evidence from both Hamas officials and Israeli hostages indicates that Hamas responded to harsh Israeli treatment of Palestinian prisoners by worsening the conditions of Israeli hostages.31 Hamas also responded to Israeli rescue attempts: after the rescue of four hostages from Nuseirat in June 2024, Hamas worsened the conditions for other hostages in the area, moving some who had been held in safe houses above ground to the cramped tunnels underneath where they also received less food.32
Despite government proclamations otherwise, this report argues that freeing the hostages (59 remain in Gaza as of writing33) has been of low priority for the Israeli government, which has consistently preferred to prolong the war by refraining from releasing the hostages and risking their lives.34 The evidence for this statement is multifactorial: the continued failure of military operations to release the hostages, Israel’s reluctance to reach a deal with Hamas for releasing the hostages, the behavior and statements by Israeli government officials and state representatives, testimonies from people involved in the negotiation process and from families of the hostages, the government’s treatment of hostages’ families, and unofficial government attempts to prevent dissent centered around the hostage families. Each category of evidence is described in a section below.
The failure of military operations
Israel’s military operations have not only failed to release hostages, but have also killed a substantial number of them, as well as many Gazan civilians. To date, only seven of the 251 hostages taken on October 7 have been released by military operations.35 Another hostage was found by himself in a tunnel by military forces in late August 2024.36 The military operation that released two hostages in February 2024 killed 74 Gazans according to one account, or more than 100 according to another, mostly civilians.37 A military operation that freed four hostages in June 2024 killed 274 Gazans, many of whom were women and children, and wounded hundreds.38 In at least some occasions the IDF operated in areas where it suspected to find hostages despite the risk to their lives since militants were ordered to execute their captives if cornered.39
An investigation published in October 2024 cited statements from IDF sources that in the first weeks of the war the IDF bombed homes of Palestinians who were associated with taking hostages without knowing if the hostages were in those homes.40 One source pointed out that early in the war “the hostages simply had no influence on attack policy”.41 The hostages who were released in the November 2023 deal repeatedly stated that the Israeli bombardments they experienced were among the most terrifying events of their captivity.42 In one case, a hostage recounted that the IDF attacked the building where he was held. He managed to escape, but the IDF continued to fire at him as he fled. He survived for four days in Gaza until he was captured again and released in the 2023 exchange.43
A New York Times report from March 2025 found that 41 hostages were killed in Gaza since the beginning of the war.44 According to Israeli sources by September 2024 the number was at least 26 hostages.45 In November 2023, three hostages were killed by gas (carbon monoxide) released by bunker buster bombs the IDF used to target a Hamas commander.46 Three Israeli hostages were killed by IDF forces within Gaza in December 2023 despite waving white flags and calling for help.47 In January 2024, a hostage was killed during an attempted rescue operation.48 In late February 2024 an Israeli report concluded that at least 10 hostages were killed by the IDF’s actions.49 This included the IDF bombing a building that it suspected had an Israeli hostage and the execution of a hostage by his captor after the IDF bombed a nearby target.50 Another IDF report concluded that six hostages were executed in February 2024, yet noted that the IDF attacks in the area would have killed them even if they had not been executed.51
In late March 2024, a senior Israeli journalist specializing in military intelligence shared an estimate that only 60-70 of the hostages were still alive.52 US intelligence assessments at the time seemed to suggest a similar number.53 The number appeared to decrease by late May.54 By October 2024, the aforementioned military intelligence journalist relayed estimates that only 25-30 hostages were still alive,55 yet in November another journalist claimed that 51 hostages were alive.56
During several operations in the spring and summer of 2024, Israeli forces found the corpses of 19 additional hostages.57 Some were suspected to have been killed directly or indirectly by IDF fire.58 These included the six hostages (Ori Danino, Hersh Goldberg Polin, Carmel Gat, Alexander Lobanov, Almog Sarusi, and Eden Yerushalmi) who were killed by their captors shortly before the arrival of the IDF in late August, apparently to avoid release of the hostages in a military operation. The captors were not caught.59 This event – in which all the hostages were young and were executed together – prompted, for the first time, a substantial number of Israelis to cast the blame for the hostages’ deaths directly on the Israeli government (see also below).60 Shortly thereafter, high officials in the military claimed that the military had warned the government that any major ground operation would risk the lives of hostages.61 There were also indications that the IDF refrained from acting upon information that could have saved the six hostages.62 No other hostages or corpses were recovered until early December 2024, when one corpse was recovered.63 In early January 2025, two corpses of hostages were recovered64 near corpses of their captors, suggesting that they were all killed by an IDF attack.65 The corpse of an IDF soldier held in Gaza since 2014 was recovered shortly afterwards, just before the second ceasefire.66
Anecdotal evidence from Israeli army units fighting in the Gaza Strip until early 2025 suggested that finding hostages was not part of their everyday mission. An Israeli journalist who visited several units and operations rooms in June 2024 said that images or names of hostages were absent, their existence was not mentioned in briefings before military operations, and their presence in the area was not mentioned as part of the IDF’s rules of engagement.67 IDF commanders acknowledged that the fighting precluded returning the hostages.68 As the war continued into the fall and winter of 2024, indications of the flagging morale of IDF troops increased. This was reflected for example in a significant drop in the number of soldiers who were willing to report for reserve duty.69 One of the explicit reasons for refusing to enlist was the failure to release hostages.70 In October, for example, 130 soldiers signed a letter that stated that they would not continue to serve in the absence of a deal to free the hostages.71 In response, the IDF removed from its rolls those reservists who refused to serve.72 By early January 2025, soldiers participating in the large operation in North Gaza (see the Zoom in 3 section) emphasized the destruction of Hamas yet stated that the hostages were not part of their operation, which was intended to increase the pressure on Hamas.73 More indications of flagging morale appeared in early March 2025.74
While military pressure failed to free Israeli hostages, over the first stage of the second ceasefire deal over January and February 2025, 30 living hostages and 8 corpses were returned to Israel.75 In early March, Netanyahu noted that of the 59 hostages still in Gaza after the first stage of the ceasefire, up to 24 were alive and at least 35 were dead.76 Anonymous sources put the actual numbers at 21-22 living hostages and 37-38 dead.77
Israel’s reluctance to reach a deal
There is much evidence that Hamas was willing to make a full hostage deal, which would have entailed releasing all the hostages and prisoners on both sides, on 8 October 2023, long before Israel’s ground invasion of the Gaza Strip.78 Already by October 9, there were indications that Hamas was willing to make a “humanitarian” deal that would have freed women, children and the elderly on both sides, without preventing a subsequent Israeli military operation.79 Neither of these possible agreements specified a ceasefire or a cessation of fighting. Israel could have reached a deal early that might have limited or delayed its military response, and that would have returned more live hostages. The Ha’aretz editorial on October 11 and an interview with an unofficial negotiator published on October 12 demonstrated little willingness to do so on the Israeli side.80 By late October 2023, Hamas already blamed Israel openly for refusing a total exchange of Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners, while voicing its willingness to conduct a partial deal.81 One of the hostages released for humanitarian reasons at that time, Yocheved Lifshitz, said later that Hamas wanted to release her and another hostage, but Israel refused to take them, fearing that the cost would be too high. Hamas then said it would just leave the two hostages near the border and let Israel take them if it wants. They were ultimately handed over “for free”.82 Biden administration officials throughout October also felt that while the Americans were prepared to negotiate with Hamas and worried about the hostages, Israel preferred to obliterate it and trusted its ability to rescue the hostages in daring operations.83
In late November 2023, the two sides agreed to a temporary ceasefire and a hostage deal that resulted in the release of 105 hostages.84 Of these, 80 were Israeli hostages released over seven consecutive days. In addition, 23 Thai hostages and one hostage from the Philippines were released due to a separate agreement between Hamas and the Thai government. A Russian-Israeli hostage was released as a gesture towards Russia’s President Vladimir Putin.85 In return, Israel released 240 Palestinian prisoners who were mostly young. Three quarters of them had not been convicted of a crime, and most of them had been in prison for less than one year.86 Despite the very low exchange rate in this deal (one Israeli for three Palestinians), compared to the aforementioned Shalit deal, Israel refused to extend it. When Hamas offered to release seven living hostages and three corpses (who Hamas claimed died in Israeli bombardments) instead of the ten expected living hostages, Israel cut the exchange short and the fighting resumed.87
Instead of negotiating additional hostage releases, the Israeli government and Prime Minister Netanyahu in particular preferred to continue Israel’s military operations. This was despite the obvious risk to the hostages, as evident from the deaths of hostages described above, who were killed by direct or indirect IDF action. Considerable evidence from both Israeli and American sources over 2024 indicates that Netanyahu purposefully obstructed a hostage deal, supposedly because he suspected that such a deal would lead to the collapse of his government. This evaluation was based on explicit public threats by senior members of his coalition.88 The hostages’ relatives also blamed Netanyahu for not making a deal and increasing social tensions within Israel, and reported on several tense meetings with him.89 Despite this evidence, media and American officials publicly cast Hamas as the only obstacle for the deal, avoiding public pressure on Netanyahu which slowed negotiations.
One opportunity to reach a deal in April 2024 failed because of resistance inside the Israeli government.90 Subsequent negotiations from May to July failed as well. A leaked document revealed that Netanyahu attempted to prevent a deal (to which Hamas agreed) that would have released some of the hostages who were killed in late August (Hersh Goldberg Polin, Carmel Gat, and Eden Yerushalmi), by changing some of Israel’s conditions for such a deal.91 Key to that document was Israel’s new insistence on remaining in control of the Philadelphi corridor, which is on the border between Gaza and Egypt, and the Rafah crossing to Egypt.92 This insistence was formally agreed to in the Israeli cabinet.93 In parallel, Netanyahu declared that Israel would also not leave the Netzarim corridor in the middle of the Strip. However, Hamas declared that Israel’s retreat from the Netzarim and Philadelphi corridors were core demands in any negotiations.94 Subsequent reports revealed that in early July, the differences between the demands of the negotiating sides were small.95 Israel’s Defense Minister at the time, Yoav Gallant, would later state in this context that Israel did not do everything possible to bring the hostages back, and that Israel could have brought back more hostages, earlier and at a lower price.96 Israel refused to proceed with the negotiations, and in late July also assassinated Ismail Haniyeh, a Hamas leader who was a key figure on the negotiating team, thus further hindering any negotiations.97
Days after the discovery of the six aforementioned executed hostages (Danino, Goldberg Polin, Gat, Lobanov, Sarusi, and Yerushalmi) in late August 2024, Netanyahu declared publicly that the Philadelphi corridor is necessary for Israel’s security. This was allegedly because of the tunnels through which Hamas would continue to smuggle weapons into the Strip, and possibly also smuggle hostages out. Not only did Netanyahu’s statement considerably obstruct the chance for negotiations,98 but a few days later, it was revealed publicly that long before the current war, the tunnels that had been uncovered under the Philadelphi corridor were sealed.99 At the time, Israel’s security chiefs were said to have assured Netanyahu that Israel could afford to withdraw from the Philadelphi and Netzarim corridors.100
In early September, a spokesperson for Netanyahu leaked to the German newspaper Bild quotes from a secret document allegedly from the computer of Hamas’ leader Yahya Sinwar.101 The document described the supposed strategy of Hamas in the negotiations over a hostage deal, specifically highlighting Hamas’s attempt to encourage demonstrations for a hostage deal in Israel. The spokesperson then asked Israeli media outlets, who could not publish the document by themselves because of military censorship, to echo the Bild piece.102 The plan was apparently to influence public opinion to stop the demonstrations calling for a hostage deal, which had intensified after the discovery of the six executed hostages.103 A subsequent investigation concluded that there was no proof that the leaked document could be associated with Sinwar.104 A separate publication, in the British Jewish Chronicle, quoted another Hamas document that mentioned smuggling hostages through the Philadelphi corridor to Egypt, and from there to Iran or Yemen. This second piece had no supporting evidence and the newspaper removed it later and ended its association with its author.105 Nonetheless, Netanyahu cited both the Bild and the Jewish Chronicle pieces in a government meeting and a foreign press conference, as aligning well with his position at the time – to prevent a hostage deal.106 Netanyahu’s wife also cited the Bild article when she met with families of the hostages.107 The spokesperson who leaked the document to the Bild was later interrogated and arrested.108 The military official who leaked the document to the spokesperson was similarly investigated but received considerable support by coalition Knesset members.109 According to the spokesperson, Netanyahu was involved in the leak.110 As of writing, this case is ongoing.
Netanyahu continued to avoid reaching a deal during the latter part of 2024. In October, he was recorded stating that Israel “can’t agree” to ending the war.111 In November, he promised Gazans a 5-million-dollar reward for each hostage that would be freed, thus drawing on a similar initiative that had been presented by an Israeli CEO who had made such an offer as well.112 As of writing, to the best of my knowledge, no one has claimed such a reward. By early December, a coalition Knesset member openly stated that the war objectives were to dismantle Hamas’ infrastructure and that a deal to release the hostages would cancel those war objectives; and therefore he would not support it.113 Negotiations stopped in November and resumed in December,114 but multiple actors and commentators from all sides appeared to agree that Netanyahu objected to ending the war.115 A poll from late December found that 47 percent of Israelis believed that the main reason there was no hostage deal was Netanyahu’s fear that his government would fall (43 percent blamed Hamas).116
In early January 2025, Israel’s Minister of National Security Itamar Ben Gvir asserted that on multiple occasions since the beginning of the war, he had used his political power to obstruct a deal.117 This was widely understood as proof that Netanyahu also obstructed a deal to prevent the collapse of his government, which depended on Ben Gvir’s support.118 Notably, already during the first ceasefire in late November 2023 Ben Gvir had tweeted “stopping the war = the dissolution of the government”.119
The second hostage deal was agreed upon in mid-January 2025. It is very likely that the main reason for the deal was a demand by incoming US President Donald Trump to have a ceasefire in place during his inauguration, as indeed happened.120 In the deal, Israel was willing to waive several of its formerly defined red lines (such as an Israeli retreat from Philadelphi corridor).121 It included three stages, each of which would last for 42 days. In the first stage that would include a temporary ceasefire, Hamas would release 33 hostages in return for 30-50 Palestinian prisoners and detainees per released hostage. Israel would significantly increase humanitarian aid and gradually leave the Gaza Strip. In the second stage, Israel and Hamas would end the war and exchange the remaining hostages according to yet undetermined ratio. The third stage would include an exchange of corpses between both sides and more significant action on reconstructing Gaza after the war.122
The deal Israel signed had been on the table for 13 months since December 2023. According to the Prime Minister of Qatar, who played a major role in the negotiation as a mediator, those 13 months went to waste as the details negotiated during them had “no meaning”, i.e. were of minor importance.123 An Israeli document in Hebrew leaked to the public included the core parts of the eventual deal already in May 2024.124 Hamas had accepted the final draft before Israel.125
Several members of Israel’s government were reluctant to sign the deal. The Minister of Finance Betzalel Smotrich – another ally upon which Netanyahu depended– agreed to the temporary ceasefire only if Netanyahu would guarantee that after the first stage of 42 days Israel would return to war (i.e. without releasing all the hostages), reduce the humanitarian aid to Gaza, take over Gazan territory permanently and encourage emigration of Gazans.126 Smotrich had obstructed other deals in Gaza in the past.127 Netanyahu himself claimed that he had guarantees from both US Presidents Biden and Trump that Israel could return to war after the first stage of the ceasefire agreement.128 During the first stage of the deal, Israel’s Deputy Speaker of the Knesset said that Israel could fool Hamas and not stick to the agreement’s second stage by returning the hostages but then unexpectedly continuing the war.129
In light of these reservations, the first stage of the deal was completed partially. Hamas released all the hostages it was supposed to, and Israel released the agreed-upon prisoners and detainees.130 Both sides repeatedly accused the other of violating the ceasefire agreement. Many violations were minor or symbolic, and were often corrected quickly.131 The most substantial violations on Hamas’ side included putting up ceremonies for the release of Israel hostages that humiliated them as well as using the hostages for propaganda purposes.132 Israel retaliated in kind by humiliating the Palestinians it released in different ways.133 Israeli violations of the deal included sporadic attacks in the Gaza Strip which resulted in the deaths of at least 116 people and the injury of over 490 during the first stage of the ceasefire.134 An Israeli commentator counted over 50 such attacks,135 and an NGO recorded at least 16 attacks on civilians during the ceasefire until February 9.136 At the same time, Hamas allegedly fired a single rocket from the Strip that fell inside the Strip.137
The more substantial violation on Israel’s side, however, was its refusal to negotiate the second stage with Hamas according to the agreed-upon timeline.138 An anonymous source provided five examples that demonstrate that Israel had no intention to continue to the second stage of the deal.139 Finally, Israel refused to evacuate from the Philadelphi corridor even though it was part of the first stage of the deal.140 Upon the completion of the first stage of the deal in early March 2025 Israel stopped all humanitarian aid to Gaza.141 This increased pressure on Hamas as well as made a return to hostilities more likely. Israel also appeared to prepare to continue fighting despite polls that showed that the Israeli public predominantly preferred to continue the deal than to resume fighting.142 A poll among Israelis from February 2025 found that 73 percent of Israelis wanted to continue to the second stage of the deal.143 Another poll in early March found that only 9 percent preferred to resume fighting.144
Behavior and statements by government officials, state representatives, and members of society
Negative sentiments towards the hostages’ families were voiced by government supporters immediately after October 7.145 Already during the winter of 2023, a propaganda array appeared to support the government by attacking hostages’ families online, sometimes leading to violence.146 As early as March 2024, several government members scorned the hostages’ family members.147 In May, coalition Knesset members ramped up their explicit attacks against the hostages’ families,148 while police and government supporters acted with violence and scorn against them in the streets.149 Additional events, including counter-demonstrations against the hostages’ families and vandalism, took place in subsequent months.150 In late May, a top aide to the Israeli Prime Minister stated that Israel would not end the war in a deal that would free all the hostages, and verbally attacked family members of the hostages who visited him.151 He also reportedly told families that the government’s moves were driven by polling.152
In July, the media reported that Hamas sent to Ben Gvir, Israel’s Minister of National Security, videos showing torture of Israeli hostages. This was presumably a means to convince him to improve the conditions of Palestinian prisoners, as he was personally involved in enforcing harsher conditions on these prisoners. However, the Minister allegedly refused and claimed the videos legitimized further worsening of the conditions of Palestinian prisoners.153 In mid-September it was revealed that some hostages were removed from the list of voters in upcoming municipal elections, suggesting that the state had given up on releasing them alive.154 In parallel, hostage families experienced increasing threats of death and violence, which were generally perceived to emanate from government supporters.155 In September 2024, a number of representatives of the hostages’ families were refused entrance to an event of the Likud, Netanyahu’s political party, while subjected to verbal abuse. This was despite advanced coordination of their attendance with the Likud.156 Eggs were thrown at other representatives of hostages outside another formal Likud event.157 Hostage relatives were also attacked regularly on an Israeli TV channel.158
The hostage exchange deal over January and February 2025 led to a resurgence in negative attention to the hostages especially among segments of the Israeli religious right. The Minister of Settlements stated that “winning the war” is more important than returning the hostages.159 Several groups of rabbis rejected the deal as it formed. More than 400 Israeli rabbis, members of the so-called Rabbinical Congress for Peace, called upon US President Donald Trump to support Israel’s war instead of push towards a deal.160 A different group of about 100 rabbis publicly rejected the deal.161 Another group of Israeli rabbis urged Netanyahu to prioritize the defeat of Hamas in context of the second stage of the hostage deal, i.e. keep fighting and not return the remaining hostages.162 An Israeli TV channel broadcast an interview with an Israeli who called to destroy everyone in Gaza, “including our hostages”.163 Many Israeli online voices attacked hostages and their family members, such as a released hostage who stated that he promised his former guards that he will teach them agriculture when peace will come was attacked online, or family members who were not grateful to Netanyahu or criticized him or government officials.164 Some of these attackers were public figures. One, for example, attacked Amit Susana, a hostage released in the first deal who testified that she was sexually assaulted, stating that she exploited her experience for publicity.165 When released hostage Eli Sharabi explicitly linked the conditions he experienced to Ben Gvir’s statements about the harsh treatment of Palestinian prisoners, Ben Gvir stated that this was Hamas propaganda and called upon Israeli media not to echo it.166
Testimonies from people involved in the negotiations and from families of the hostages
Over time, several testimonies from people involved in the negotiations indicated that the government was not committed to releasing the hostages. This echoed concerns voiced by the hostages’ families. In a meeting with Netanyahu in December 2023 some relatives of hostages heckled Netanyahu by saying “Shame”,167 while others left the meeting in outrage.168 A brother of an Israeli hostage killed by the IDF threatened Israeli Defense Minister by stating that he would haunt him in his sleep.169 Criticism arrived from hostages as well. One of the hostages who was later killed in Gaza, Haim Peri, had reportedly said to another hostage who was released in the November 2023 hostage deal that he expected they would stay in captivity for two years because the Prime Minister “is Netanyahu and we’re leftists”.170
In mid-March 2024, the chief of staff of the IDF unit that was responsible for the hostages resigned as he felt that Israel’s political leadership was not interested in moving towards a deal.171 Similar feelings were expressed within Israel’s security apparatus.172 In late March some of the hostages’ family members publicly blamed Israel’s Prime Minister for continuously postponing a deal to release the hostages.173 Nearly 600 relatives of 81 hostages wrote a letter to US President Biden expressing frustration with the Israeli government’s lack of commitment to reaching a deal and asking him to put pressure on Netanyahu.174 As early as March 2024, some family members stated that Netanyahu’s conduct regarding the hostages amounted to “a crime”.175 In mid-April, two members of Israel’s negotiations team, at least one of whom was involved in it for six months, stated explicitly that the government and especially Israel’s prime minister were trying to delay and even prevent a deal to release the hostages.176 A former spokesperson for the hostage families agreed that Israel’s Prime Minister was preventing a deal due to personal political reasons.177 Several domestic and foreign sources, including sources from Qatar, said similar things.178 Family members of the hostages agreed as well.179 In May, families said that the government was sacrificing the hostages.180
In June 2024, a senior Israeli politician and former member of the war cabinet stated that the Prime Minister rejected a deal for political reasons.181 In late July, a senior official involved in the hostage negotiations stated that Netanyahu was leading the negotiation to a crisis and that the negotiation team was an illusion that served him.182 In early August, a high official involved in the negotiations said that the high officials in Israel’s security apparatus believed that Netanyahu did not want to reach a deal.183 In late August, the mother of hostage Matan Zangauker testified that the head of the Mossad told her that in the current political configuration a hostage deal was impossible.184 Another source involved in the negotiations claimed that Netanyahu was sabotaging the talks “once again”.185 A semi-official negotiator who had successfully negotiated with Hamas in the past claimed that he had reached breakthroughs in the current negotiations as early as May 2024, but that he was told to stop his negotiations channel. In more informal negotiations, during August, he reached a potential agreement with Hamas. However, he stated that Netanyahu did not want to end the war and refused those agreements.186 By late December, the father of a hostage went as far as meeting with the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Karim Khan, who had issued arrest warrants against Netanyahu, in hopes to increase the pressure on Netanyahu to reach a hostage deal.187 The mother of one of the hostages noted in December 2024 that after speaking to Netanyahu she realized that the government will not agree to a complete deal.188
In context of the final negotiations for the second exchange deal in January 2025, Israel’s main negotiators allegedly felt that Netanyahu was purposefully disrupting negotiations.189 Another senior member of the Israeli negotiation team gave a full interview in which he reiterated that a deal could have been reached at least twice during the first half of 2024 had Israel been more flexible in its approach to the negotiations.190 A father of one of the hostages accused Netanyahu of “playing games” with the return of his son in March 2025.191 Some of the released hostages joined in these attempts to publicly pressure Netanyahu to agree to a deal. In a letter to Netanyahu, 56 of the released hostages called upon him to sign a deal and bring the remaining hostages back.192 Seven released hostages also visited US President Donald Trump in attempt to expedite the return of the remaining hostages.193
Government treatment of hostages’ families and released hostages
Throughout the war, the Israeli government weaponized the hostage issue domestically and internationally but did not supporting the hostage families and released hostages in a commensurate manner.
Family members of hostages repeatedly pointed out the lack of communication from government officials. Some families did not get information from a government-authorized party for two weeks after October 7.194 Netanyahu first met representatives of the hostage families only on October 15, and the families received no update that the IDF was beginning its ground offensive in late October despite its relevance for their situation.195 These communication issues were pervasive throughout the war.196 In April 2024, for example, the father of a hostage stated that Netanyahu’s “lack of communication with us is a ‘national embarrassment’”.197 On several occasions Israeli media referred to cases in which families attempted to meet with Netanyahu or government officials but were ignored or refused.198 Released hostages also noted the lack of attention by government officials. Amit Sousana noted on TV that nobody from the government contacted her after her release.199 Another freed hostage said in a meeting with Israel’s war cabinet in December 2023 that “the feeling we had there was that no one was doing anything for us”.200 Although the IDF discovered that hostages were killed by its own airstrikes in March 2024, it notified their families only in September.201 When the Ministry of Health published a report on the experiences of hostages in Gaza it did not update the released hostages about its details.202
This approach is not new. In the case of Avera Mengistu, an Israeli hostage held by Hamas for over a decade and released in the early 2025 prisoner exchange, already in 2015 Israeli media revealed government attempts to intimidate and pressure his family to avoid publicly blaming Netanyahu for not doing enough to release him. The official coordinator threatened the family that such behavior, or attempts to turn the Mengistu’s case into an issue of the Ethiopian community (Mengistu is Ethiopian) would result in Mengistu remaining in Gaza for additional years.203 In 2019 as part of attempted negotiations for returning the pre-October 7 hostages, the Hamas’ spokesperson claimed that Israel did not inquire into Mengistu’s well-being or ask if he is dead or alive.204 According to a prominent Israeli MK, Israel had negotiated with Sinwar over a pre-October 7 hostage deal until the summer of 2023.205
In other occasions, government officials criticized relatives of hostages. In a January 2024 meeting Netanyahu’s wife, who accompanied him in a meeting with hostages’ relatives, told them that their statements in the media helped Hamas.206 A Likud MK accused a hostage’s brother of using the situation to promote a political agenda.207 In parallel, government institutions were used to scorn the families of the hostages. In early January 2025, Einav Zangauker, the mother of a hostage and vocal critic of the government’s reluctance to reach a deal, was prohibited from entering the Israeli Knesset for one week.208 In early March 2025, a group of relatives of hostages and of soldiers who had been killed during the war was forcibly evacuated from the entrance to the Knesset’s main hall.209
In one indicative case in February 2025, the hostage Yarden Bibas and the corpses of his wife Shiri and their two small children Ariel and Kfir were returned to Israel. Although the deaths of the latter three were widely expected,210 the return of a family that became one of the symbols of the war drew much public attention in Israel and abroad.211 The cause of the deaths of Shiri and the children became a central issue. While the Palestinian group that held them had claimed they had died in an Israeli airstrike already in November 2023,212 the IDF spokesperson stated that based on forensic evidence they were killed by their captors’ hands.213 Neither side offered evidence for their claims.214 An Israeli reporter suggested that the truth of both claims would likely remain unknown because of the time that passed since the deaths and the decomposition of the corpses.215
Although the Bibas family members had died over a year earlier, the state of Israel and in particular Netanyahu weaponized their deaths both domestically and internationally.216 At the same time, Yarden and his family publicly declined to have any state representative at the funeral.217 They also repeatedly asked high Israeli officials, including Netanyahu, to cease from providing additional information about the manner of the deaths of Shiri and the children (Yarden’s sister called it “abuse”), and sent a formal letter to that effect, noting in it that they had not received a forensic report.218 Despite these requests, Netanyahu spoke publicly about those details in two separate cases (at a military ceremony and at AIPAC).219 A couple of weeks later, Yarden wrote a letter to Netanyahu asking him to take responsibility for his role in the October 7 fiasco.220
Unofficial government attempts to prevent dissent
There have been indications that the government, or people associated with it, have attempted to prevent dissent in Israeli society by pressuring or dividing between the hostages’ families.221 A strategic advisor testified that two weeks after the beginning of the war, a government official attempted to hire him to split or destroy the group that unified the hostage families.222 Such a split among the hostage families did indeed occur early, with a small “Tikvah [Hope] Forum” developing by November 2023. The Tikvah Forum represented the few families who supported the government’s policy regarding the hostages.223 Already early in the war, the government appointed a coordinator for the hostages and their families, who told them that they should not hold demonstrations.224 The spokesperson for the Likud, the largest party in the Israeli parliament, met the families of the hostages in January 2024 and warned them against pushing for an early election because “it will be bad for the hostages” and “in such a period [i.e. elections] a lot of filth will surface”.225
Most of the hostages’ families organized through the Hostages and Missing Families Forum that came into being in early-mid October 2023 and generally attempted to maintain an apolitical position regarding the government to avoid antagonizing it. This organization changed its key personnel on several occasions, often in context of alleged or implied meddling by Netanyahu or his government. One of the Forum’s three founders left already in late October 2023 after he allegedly was associated with Netanyahu and his staff (two other organizers left as well).226 The original chairman (also a founder) left his position in February 2024 after several family members received threats from Israeli MKs who predicated their support to the Forum upon the departure of the chairman.227 The original spokesman for the Forum (the third founder) left in March 2024 during a bout of negotiations for a deal and suggested that he was threatened to do so. In April 2024 he claimed that Netanyahu’s meddling with the Forum led him to quit.228 The CEO changed as well in July 2024 after the original CEO was accused of sexual harassment and verbal abuse.229 The Forum’s strategic advisor changed three times by November 2024 (one left in March after rumors that he was Netanyahu’s associate,230 the third left in November 2024231). At the same time, the Forum hired an advisor who had worked with Netanyahu and participated in a Likud campaign.232 Netanyahu’s involvement took other forms as well. In July 2024 an Israeli TV channel revealed that a Likud activist and Netanyahu associate set up several meetings between hostage family members and Netanyahu’s spouse.233
There is additional evidence from early in the war that families of the hostages feared that if they spoke up too loudly their family members might be pushed to the end of the list of hostages to be released.234 An Israeli TV journalist considered supportive of Netanyahu implied the same in January 2025 when saying that one of the hostages’ mothers was more outspoken early on in speaking against the government, but then moderated her tone and was able to receive her daughter back.235 In this light as well as the aforementioned details in this section it is very likely that other relatives of the hostages prefer to self-censor their critique of the government as well.