US involvement in the war
Last updated: June 18, 2024
The US has played a crucial role in the Israel-Gaza war since its beginning by providing support for Israel. This support took several forms: military aid (actual weapons) and funding to purchase such weapons from the US; protecting Israel by deploying US military assets defensively and offensively; diplomatic support; and largely freeing Israel from American oversight and accountability. Each form is discussed in a separate subsection below. The fifth subsection examines the significant changes in American rhetoric over the war which became more critical as the war continued. The overall trend is clear – the US overwhelmingly supported Israel through its actions. Its more critical remarks towards Israel led to almost no changes in its policy towards Israel. The final section briefly deals with notable cases of visible internal dissent in the US – in both the administration and in broader society. A later section, “Zoom-in 2”, examines the campus protests in the US over April and May.
US military aid to Israel
The US has been supporting Israel for long before the war, to the extent that “Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of US foreign assistance since World War II”, with a total of $158 billion provided until 2023 (more than $260 billion and up to $317.9 billion if adjusted for inflation).1 In 2016, the US and Israeli governments agreed that over the ten years between 2019 and 2028 the US would provide Israel with a total of $38 billion in military aid (in the previous two decades, the US had provided Israel with a total of $30 and $21.3 billion in military aid).2 Over the decade before the war (2013-2022), 68% of Israel’s weapon imports came from the US.3
The US began providing military support to Israel with hours of the Oct. 7 attack. In the next ten days, the US sent five shipments of military aid to Israel.4 In the first two months of the war, the US may have sent some 200 planes carrying a total of some 10,000 tons of military equipment.5 In the first three months of the war, the US provided Israel with at least 15,000 bombs, including more than 5,000 unguided bombs and more than 5,400 two-thousand pound bombs, as well as over 57,000 155mm artillery shells6 (Israel used over 100,000 artillery shells in less than two months of fighting).7 Additional munitions requested include kamikaze drones, dive-bombing drones, missiles, rockets and mortar rounds.8 Subsequent months saw more sales of the same and similar items.9
In early March it was revealed that the US approved more than 100 separate military sales to Israel since the beginning of the war, as the Biden administration bypassed Congress to approve the packages, avoiding reporting on them by drawing from existing US stockpiles, accelerating previously approved deliveries and sending the weapons in smaller batches that fall below the minimum dollar threshold that requires the administration to notify Congress.10 Only two approved sales to Israel had been made public by that point.11 At the same time, officials claimed there were 600 active cases of potential military transfer or sales to Israel, worth more than $23 billion.10 In subsequent weeks and months the US continued to sign off on more military sales to Israel. In late March, for example, it authorized the transfer of another 1,800 two-thousand pound bombs as well as another 500 five-hundred-pound bombs, and authorized the transfer of 25 fighter jets and engines.12 In early April, the US administration authorized the transfer of over 2,000 smaller bombs (five-hundred pounds or smaller) to Israel.13
Although the US provided an enormous amount of military aid to Israel throughout the war, the flow of munitions slowed down after a few months as the US began running short on munitions it could quickly provide to Israel while also meeting Ukraine’s needs and maintaining’s the US’s own supplies.10 The US continued selling weapons to Israel during April, considering a deal of more than $18 billion to sell up to 50 fighter jets.14 In April, the US House of Representatives approved $26.3 billion of aid to Israel (direct military aid, but also funding to replenish US stockpiles, support for US operations in the region and humanitarian aid).15 In early May, the US admitted that it delayed sending one shipment of weapons to Israel (6,500 JDAMs, kits that turn “dumb” bombs into precision bombs).16 Almost in parallel, however, it continued to push existing deals – including one worth over $1 billion – through the pipeline.17
All of the above demonstrate the US’ continued strong support of Israel militarily.
Active deployment of US military
The US has also supported Israel through the active deployment of US military assets in the Middle East region since the beginning of the war. In the first few days after October 7, the US sent two aircraft carrier groups to the area. Subsequently more aircraft were sent to the region.18 Other assets, such as some of the US’ most powerful missile defense systems were also deployed to the Middle East.19 In mid October, the US prepared about 2,000 US troops for possible deployment to Israel.20 All of these signaled its commitment to support Israel and to deter any widening of the war. In case the war escalated out of control, the US military also had plans to evacuate all US citizens from Israel (more than 600,000 people).21 In addition, the US sent a general and several other officers to help advise Israel’s military leadership in the war.22
Some US forces operated within Israel. At least two US bases are known within Israel.23 Media coverage revealed that the US was using contractors in “multiple military bases” in Israel, ostensibly to support US Special Operation forces within the country.24 There were also Delta Force troops in Israel early in the war.25 According to the Pentagon, these troops provided intelligence and planning as well as advice to the IDF on hostage recovery efforts, and they participated at least in these manners in the Israeli operation that ended up releasing four hostages in June.26 Other personnel involved in the war and in Israel include CIA officers, FBI agents, and DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) personnel.27 Biden’s National Security Adviser said the intelligence the US was passing to Israel was not limited and that the US is “not holding anything back. We are providing every asset, every tool, every capability”.27
As the war continued, the US was drawn more closely into actual combat, often in the form of bombing targets that were aggressive or critical toward Israel and the role the US played in the war. In the Red Sea in particular, US ships shot down many missiles sent by the Houthis in Yemen, beginning in mid-October.28 When the Houthis began attacking Israeli-affiliated ships and ships sailing to Israel,29 the US began to bomb them as well, with strikes beginning in mid January and continuing as of the writing of this document.30 American support for Israel during the war led to over 170 attacks against US bases in Iraq and Syria.31 After three US service members were killed in an attack on a base in or near Jordan in late January,32 the US proceeded with a widespread campaign of air attacks and assassinations on targets in the region (attacking in Yemen, Iraq and Syria) that continued in subsequent months.33
The US briefly became directly involved in the broader Middle East conflict when it participated in shooting down drones and missiles that Iran fired towards Israel in mid April in response to the Israeli attack on the Iranian embassy in Syria (which Israel did not inform the US about).34 After allegedly shooting down more than half of the Iranian missiles and drones of what was one of the largest drone strikes in history,35 the US quickly declared that it would not join Israel in counterattacking Iran.36 As such, it likely played an important role in deescalating the subsequent immediate tensions between Israel and Iran.
Diplomatic support
Throughout the war, the US provided Israel with strong diplomatic support which became indispensable for Israel’s conduct of its war in Gaza. The clearest indication of this diplomatic support was a series of US vetoes in the UN Security Council, the only UN body with executive power. Other indications include the use of US leverage to influence international institutions such as the International Criminal Court.
The US reinforced its diplomatic support by attempting to prevent de-escalation talk already at the beginning of the war. An internal memo in mid October discouraged diplomats from making public statements that the US wants to see less violence, stating that high-level officials do not want press materials to use specific phases: “de-escalation/ceasefire”, “end to violence/bloodshed” and “restoring calm”.37 A few days earlier, the US Secretary of State used such a phrase on Twitter/X, then deleted his tweet and replaced it with a more militaristic version.38 This move removed pressure from Israel at the beginning of the war, which was its bloodiest stage as of writing, and allowed it more freedom to act as it willed.
The US reinforced its diplomatic support for Israel in the United Nations. In mid October, it vetoed a Security Council resolution calling for “humanitarian pauses” in the fighting (12 countries voted in favor, the US voted against, 2 other countries abstained).39 In late October, it rejected a General Assembly non-binding resolution calling for a humanitarian ceasefire (which passed by 121 to 14, with 44 abstentions).40 In early December the US vetoed a second Security Council resolution that called for “an immediate humanitarian ceasefire” (13 countries voted in favor, the US voted against, one other country abstained).41 In late February, the US vetoed a third resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire (13 countries voted in favor, the US voted against, one other country abstained).42 In a fourth Security Council vote in late March calling for an immediate ceasefire during Ramadan the US chose to abstain (14 other countries voted in favor), causing those present at the Security Council to applause in hope that the war was about to end.43 Nonetheless, the US quickly declared that the resolution was not binding.44 This resolution had no impact.
The US was also involved in stopping other motions from moving forward.45 Therefore, for example, it vetoed the Palestinian request for full UN membership in mid April (12 countries in favor, the US against, 2 abstentions).46 According to the executive director of the American Arab Chamber of Commerce, the US Secretary of State threatened that if Palestine would become a state, the US will defund the UN, which would lead to famine (“the world would have to starve as the Gazans are”). 47 The US’s own attempt to propose a temporary ceasefire – incidentally the first time it used the term “ceasefire” – was vetoed by Russia and China in March.48 In June the US made more serious efforts to reach a ceasefire, but as of writing was unable to get Israel or Hamas to accept its proposal publicly.
Israel itself implied that the US had some kind of clout with the International Criminal Court (ICC). In April, amidst rumors that the ICC will issue warrants for Israeli leaders including its Prime Minister, Israel announced to the US that it will punish the Palestinian Authority, potentially causing its collapse.49 The move was a signal to the Americans to pressure the ICC and try to prevent the issue of warrants. In parallel, 12 Republican senators wrote a letter to the ICC Prosecutor threatening him personally as well as his employees and associates and their families if he issued a warrant for Israel’s leaders (“Target Israel and we will target you… You have been warned.”).50
When the ICC did, in fact, begin the process of putting out arrest warrants against Israeli leaders, Biden rejected the ICC’s application and stated that “What’s happening is not genocide”.51 The US administration followed by signaling that it will censure the ICC with sanctions,52 and the US House passed a sanctions bill that would apply economic sanctions and visa restrictions to individuals and judges associated with the ICC as well as their family members.53
US oversight and Israeli accountability
In parallel to its strong support of Israel, the US state apparatus minimized its oversight of Israeli actions in what was almost certainly a political decision by the US administration. De facto, the US state apparatus preferred not to know or to feign ignorance of clear evidence coming out from Gaza. At the same time, the US did not seriously hold Israeli accountable for past and present misconduct. As a result, Israel was not accountable for its actions even within the US’ own frameworks and mechanisms for overseeing aid and its use.
In the first three months of the war the US had not formally assessed whether Israel’s actions in Gaza violated human rights, despite many indications that raised that possibility.54 Its Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that South Africa’s genocide charge against Israel – deemed to be plausible by the ICJ at the time – was “meritless”.55 The outright rejection of such allegations prevented a more serious assessment of Israel’s conduct, which could have had more serious consequences for the US support of Israel. There are clear indications that the top officials in the US preferred to stall any such assessments.56
According to the 1997 “Leahy laws” (named after the senator who sponsored them) in the US, the US is required to cut off assistance to any foreign military or law enforcement units that are credibly accused of flagrant human right violations. This credible information standard is intentionally low and does not require proof or clear and convincing evidence.57 Israel, however, has long been treated leniently on this issue.56 A review by the Guardian found that special mechanisms were used to shield Israel from the Leahy laws, and that no similar special arrangements exist for any other US ally (as one former state department official stated “everyone knew the rules were different for Israel”).58 A former director of the State Department office responsible for Leahy laws vetting said the same.57 Despite several letters by Leahy himself that refer to gross violations of human rights by the IDF, no unit had been punished for that reason.59
A similar case has to do with intelligence sharing. According to US laws, the recipient of the intelligence is supposed to be compliant with international law. In the case of Israel, internal reviews found evidence that its assurances of compliance with international law were insufficient and that there was little independent oversight to confirm that the intelligence that the US supplied was not contributing to civilian deaths.60 Some officials and lawmakers expressed the same concerns.27 As noted above, there were no indications that the US limited its intelligence sharing with Israel in response.27
In late April, a week-long media story reflected the Biden administration’s approach to Israeli accountability. The so-called “Leahy laws” were central in this case as well. On April 18, ProPublica published a story about Blinken ignoring a special State Department panel’s recommendation to disqualify some Israeli units from US military aid for abuses such as extrajudicial killings and an allegation that interrogators tortured and raped a Palestinian teenager accused of throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails.61 On April 20 (the same day the US House voted to pass $26 billion in Emergency Israel Aid),62 the website Axios published a scoop according to which the US was expected to sanction a specific IDF unit for its human rights violations in the West Bank. Most of these violations took place well before the current war,57 and include, for example, a case in which soldiers from the said unit captured a 78 year old Palestinian-American, handcuffed and gagged him and left him on the ground. He was found dead a few hours later (no criminal charges were pressed in the case).63 Two other military units and two civilian units were accused of “human rights violations” but the US administration was content to resolve the issue with those four units through Israeli “remediation” efforts.64 The same day that the Axios scoop was released, the Israeli Prime Minister responded with outrage to the idea of sanctions on an IDF unit (“If anyone thinks they can impose sanctions on a unit of the IDF – I will fight it with all my strength”; he also called it “the height of absurdity and a moral low”).65 The story drew much attention for a few days,66 after which Blinken wrote in an internal letter that was leaked to ABC that Israel has presented new information about the unit and that he opted for a process of “effective remediation” as the way forward rather than sanctions.67 A former director of the State Department office responsible for Leahy vetting later said this approach was unprecedentedly lenient.57
The same day (April 26), a leaked confidential US paper revealed that in an internal document sent to Blinken, according to USAID (10 USAID officials cleared the paper) Israel was violating international humanitarian law, partially by blocking US-funded humanitarian support to Gaza.68 As was revealed the next day, the document also included four State Department bureaus that assessed that Israel’s assurances were “neither credible nor reliable” and that Israel repeatedly attacked protected sites and civilian infrastructure, took little action to investigate violations, killed humanitarian workers and journalists at an unprecedented rate, and arbitrarily restricted humanitarian aid.69 A few weeks later in mid-May, the State Department released its official report in response to the NSM-20 memorandum that required that the administration report to the US Congress on whether there were credible reports or allegations that undercut Israel’s assurances that it was complying with humanitarian law.70 The report concluded that Israel likely used US weapons in “incidents that raise concerns” about its legal compliance, but also concluded that Israel was not currently blocking humanitarian aid, that there was no direct indication of Israel intentionally targeting civilians, and pointed out that Israel was overall committed to international law.71 An independent task force published a detailed account that strongly disputed the conclusions of the report.72 Shortly after the report was published, a 20-year veteran of the US State Department, who was one of the subject matter experts that drafted the report (until taken off of it in late April), resigned in protest and said that the report’s conclusion went against the overwhelming view of experts consulted on the report, and that it was clear that Israel was playing a role in limiting the amount of food and medical supplies crossing into Gaza.73
As the war continued, the US eventually placed sanctions on representatives of extreme right-wing movements within Israel but these were generally symbolic. In February, the US targeted four individuals accused of attacking Palestinians and Israeli peace activists in the West Bank. The four were blocked from using the US financial system and barred US citizens from dealing with them.74 This took place as Biden visited Michigan, a key state for the upcoming election that had a large Arab-American population critical of his support of Israel.75 The sanctions were a sign that Biden was attempting to placate his critics. In mid-March, the US announced new sanctions against two illegal outposts which served as a base for attacks by settlers against Palestinian civilians, as well as three other settlers.76 Although at first Israeli banks blocked the seven settlers from using their personal and business bank accounts, 77 Israeli media reported that the US eased the sanctions after a threat by Israel’s Finance Minister to cause the collapse of the Palestinian economy (the US claimed the ease of sanctions was consistent across other sanctions programs).78 A third round of sanctions in mid April targeted an ally of Israel’s National Security Minister as well as two entities that had raised funds for settlers targeted in earlier rounds of sanctions.79 A fourth round of sanctions in mid June was directed at a settler organization that attacked humanitarian aid convoys to Gaza.80 The sanctions themselves, especially in their moderated version, remain limited in scale and ineffective.81 The settlers themselves, as well as local rights groups and Palestinians in the West Bank, described the sanctions as having minimal impact.82 The few individuals involved so far suggests that the US administration used the sanctions in attempt to signal displeasure – more to domestic US voters than to Israeli or international audiences – but refrained from meaningfully doing something to change the situation during the war.
US-Israeli relations
Although the US continued to support Israel throughout the war, it also reprimanded it verbally for its conduct of the war in increasingly serious terms. Some of this approach likely aimed at limiting the significant hit to the US’s international reputation because of its support of Israel as well as appease domestic voters in the upcoming elections. At the same time, US has set certain limitations on Israel’s conduct since the beginning of the war. Some of these limitations have been successful in preventing Israel from opening an extra front in Lebanon, or slowing down and reducing the scale of the Israeli invasion into Rafah. At the same time, however, the US government refrained from taking serious action following its statements and declarations. This section of the document touches upon the relations on a monthly basis, generally with a paragraph for every month after October and focusing on what high US officials such as President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken said.
The US administration’s messaging in early and mid-October emphasized the US’s complete support of Israel. Already on Oct. 7, Biden stated that the “the United States stands with Israel. We will not ever fail to have their back”. The president promised coordination with Israel, material, military and diplomatic support, which he described as “rock solid”.83 In mid-October, Biden visited Israel, stating that “I come to Israel with a single message: You’re not alone,” Biden said. “As long as the United States stands — and we will stand forever — we will not let you ever be alone.”84
Beginning in late October, however, the rising Palestinian death toll led the US administration to shift its message to include Palestinian civilians. Both Biden and Blinken spoke explicitly about humanitarian aid for Palestinians and the need to protect them during Israel’s ground invasion.85 Biden expressed confidence that “Israel is going to act under the measure… the rules of war” and that “the innocents in Gaza [would] be able to have access to medicine and food and water”,86 and pressed Netanyahu to get more humanitarian aid into Gaza.87 Blinken stated that Palestinian civilians were victims of Hamas and that “the lives of Palestinian civilians must be protected”, among others through allowing essential humanitarian aid into Gaza.88 The Biden administration also urged its Israeli counterparts to think about an exit strategy before launching its ground invasion, and to exercise caution in its conduct of the war.85 As discussed above US support has not changed in a meaningful way despite the Israeli conduct that has generally ignored these prescient early warnings, which remain relevant until the present time of writing.
In November, the US continued to urge Israel to restrain its military response, at the same time that Israeli officials – sometimes giving speeches in the same time and place – rejected the idea.89 Biden and his top advisers warned Israel that international backlash would soon erode support for Israel with dire consequences to the IDF and Israel.90 The US President reiterated that the two-state solution was the only way to resolve the broader conflict,91 said that al-Shifa hospital “must be protected” in the context of the first Israeli raid on it in November,92 and also noted that extremist settlers in the West Bank must be held accountable for their violent acts.93 Blinken criticized Israel for not doing enough to minimize harm to civilians in Gaza, stating that “far too many” Palestinians have died and suffered.94 He even compared the Palestinian children he saw pulled from the wreckage to his own children, because “how can we not?”.95 More than 500 appointees and staff members criticized Biden’s unwavering support for Israel in a letter and demanded a ceasefire, and over 1,000 staffers at USAID called upon the administration to make better use of its leverage to limit the civilian death toll in Gaza.96 Despite these warnings, the US did not establish any red lines for Israel.90
In December, Biden warned that Israel was losing international support because of its “indiscriminate bombing” of Gaza, and suggested that Netanyahu had “to change his government”.97 Blinken reiterated the need for Israel to protect civilians and sustain humanitarian assistance,98 and pointed out the gap between Israel’s “declared intentions to protect civilians [sic] and the mounting casualties seen on the ground”.99 He added that “there must be no enduring internal displacement” in the Strip.100 At meetings in one of his visits to Israel, Blinken clarified that Israel would have until early January to finish its ground operation,101 although Israel’s army chief stated that the war will continue for “many more months”.102 Blinken also said that bringing the war to an end “as quickly as possible” was a top priority for the US administration.103
In January, both Biden and Blinken attempted to discuss regional peace within the framework of the two state solution,104 and even reviewed the options for the US to recognize a Palestinian state after the war.105 Although Netanyahu stated that he would not allow the creation of a Palestinian state, Biden said it could still move forward with Netanyahu in office.106 US officials claimed that Biden was “running out” of patience with Netanyahu, that there were deep frustrations on the US side, and that Biden told Netanyahu that he did not want a year of war in Gaza.107 Blinken stated that Palestinians must be allowed to return to their homes in Gaza and must not be displaced from the Gaza Strip.108 On a different occasion he described the conflict as “gutwrenching” and that “the suffering breaks my heart”.109
In February, Biden described Israel’s military campaign as “over the top” and claimed he was ”pushing very hard now to deal with this hostage cease-fire”.110 The White House spokesman said that an operation in Rafah in the current circumstances “would be a disaster for those people [i.e. Palestinians] and we would not support it.”110 A few days later, Biden told Netanyahu in a phone call that a military operation in Rafah should not proceed without a “credible and executable plan for ensuring the safety of and support for the more than one million people sheltering there”.111 At the same time, three US officials admitted that the US will not punish Israel if it launches such a military campaign into Rafah.112 Blinken stated that “Israel must ensure that the delivery of life-saving assistance to Gaza is not blocked for any reason, by anyone” and urged Israel “to do more to help civilians”.113 Although both Biden and Blinken pushed for a ceasefire plan (with Biden hoping for a ceasefire within a week), Netanyahu openly stated that the war will continue until Israel was completely victorious.114 Perhaps in response, Blinken stated that Israel’s expansion of settlements in the West Bank was “inconsistent with international law”, returning to US policy before the Trump administration.115
Early March saw the continuation of the ceasefire narrative, when Biden’s Vice President Kamala Harris called for an “immediate ceasefire for at least the next six weeks” in Gaza because of “the immense scale of suffering in Gaza”.116 To date no such ceasefire has materialized. As the US admitted that the entire population of Gaza was experiencing “severe levels of acute food insecurity”,117 the US began airdropping aid into Gaza and began work on a temporary pier (see above for both).118 In mid March, the US Senate Majority Leader criticized Netanyahu, declaring that he was “a major obstacle to peace” that “lost his way”.119 Biden later praised the “good” speech.120 Biden himself said that Netanyahu was “hurting Israel more than helping Israel”,121 and asserted that “Humanitarian assistance cannot be a secondary consideration or a bargaining chip… Protecting and saving innocent lives has to be a priority”.122 The US administration also focused on the future Rafah campaign. The month also marked Biden’s first use of the idea of a red line with regards to an invasion of Rafah (“It is a red line, but I’m never going to leave Israel”), although many chose to interpret it in a limited manner that did not completely reject all Israeli military operations in Rafah.123 Blinken declared that “a major military ground operation [i.e. in Rafah] is not the way to do it. It risks killing many more civilians… it risks further isolation of Israel around the world and jeopardizing its long-term security and standing”.124 Biden’s Vice President Harris said that the US did not rule out any action against Israel in case it would attack Rafah.125 Netanyahu, however, declared that if the US will not support an attack on Rafah, “we’ll do it by ourselves”.126
In early April Biden stated that Israel “has not done enough to protect aid workers” or civilians in Gaza and said he was “outraged and heartbroken by the deaths of the World Central Kitchen workers.127 He reiterated that Israel had to take specific and concrete steps to address civilian harm, humanitarian suffering, and aid worker safety, and claimed that US policy on Gaza was contingent on Israel following those steps.128 Biden also said that Netanyahu was making a “mistake” in his approach to Gaza.129 Blinken warned that Israel risked becoming indistinguishable from Hamas if it didn’t protect Gazan civilians.130 The US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, however, maintained that the US did not have “any evidence” that Israel was committing genocide in Gaza (but did not completely reject the idea).131 The Iranian attack in mid-April – in which the US took a major role in the defense of Israel – disrupted the trend of critical US statements. By the end of the month, the US administration reverted to merely calling upon Israel to allow more humanitarian aid into Gaza (for context – April was the month that saw the most supplies entering Gaza as of writing).132 The US administration also began calling for a ceasefire deal that Israel supposedly accepted, despite no indications that Israel was actually supporting such a deal.132
In early May, Biden conditioned aid for the first time, specifically saying that he would stop sending bombs and artillery shells to Israel if it launched a major invasion of Gaza: “I made it clear that if they go into Rafah – they haven’t gone in Rafah yet – if they go into Rafah, I’m not supplying the weapons that have been used historically to deal with Rafah, to deal with the cities – that deal with that problem.”133 The Rafah invasion did take place, and not only did Biden not openly halt shipments of weapons to Israel according to what US media described as an “ultimatum” to Israel (an anonymous official claimed one shipment was held),134 but a few days later his administration pushed forward a $1 billion arms sale to Israel.135 In late May, the US administration clarified that it will not change its Israel policy,136 as the Israeli operation in Rafah expanded.137 Furthermore, the bipartisan leadership of the United States House of Representatives and Senate invited Netanyahu to address a Joint Meeting of Congress.138 At the same time, Biden called for a permanent ceasefire, making public an earlier proposal and urging both Israel and Hamas to agree.139 In parallel to this inconsistent messaging, the US nonetheless ramped up its critique of Israel. Biden admitted that Israeli forced used US bombs to kill Palestinian civilians,70 and anonymous top officials described Israel’s strategy in Gaza as “self-defeating”.140 In response, some Israeli voices attempted to draw links between the US and Hamas based on some of their shared interests,141 while Israel’s Minister of National Security declared that “Hamas ❤️Biden” in a tweet.142
In June, Biden stated in an interview that “there is every reason for people to draw [the] conclusion” that Netanyahu was prolonging the war for his own political gain.143 His statement fitted a CIA assessment that concluded that Netanyahu would defy pressure to define an “end state” for Gaza.144 At the same time, the Biden administration concluded that Israel had not “crossed a red line on Rafah”, presenting the Israeli operation as “an uptick”.145 For context, a Palestinian poll found that 51% of the respondents in the Gaza Strip claimed that the Rafah attack specifically displaced them.146
Dissent in the US administration and society
Over the course of the war many American officials chose to voice their dissent, some under their own name and others anonymously. Some eight or nine officials resigned publicly until late May.147 In early May, officials who resigned said they identified an uptick in non-public resignations.148 According to one of those who resigned publicly, over 24 people may have resigned privately.149 Others used different channels. In one letter in February, over 800 civil servants from the EU and the US dissented from their government’s support for the war in Gaza.150 In April, 90 lawyers in the US and abroad – including 20 that work in the Biden administration – called upon the president to stop military aid to Israel (by May the number increased to 130 in total).151 Several senior US officials noted in an internal memo that they doubted the credibility of Israel’s assurances on its use of US weapons.69 Others anonymously described Biden’s policy on Israel as “a blatantly horrific and stupid mistake”.152
The war has polarized Americans. While support for Israel remained stronger among Republican voters, a large number of polls indicates that Biden’s policy towards the war found little support among Democrat voters, who voiced their displeasure through different means as the war progressed. While 50% of Americans approved Israel’s military action in November, in March the number dropped to 36%.153 Already in January, 35% of Americans thought that Israel was committing genocide in Gaza (49% Democrats, 18% of Republicans).154 The ratio increased in May to 39% (56% Democrats, 23% Republicans).155 In March, 52% of Americans (62% of Biden voters, 30% Trump voters) agreed that the US government should stop weapon shipments to Israel until Israel stops its attack on Gaza.156 When the question was framed as sending military aid to Israel to help in its war against Hamas, 36% of Americans supported the policy, and 35% opposed it.157 In May, 51% of American Jews supported Biden’s decision to withhold arms shipments to Israel if it continued its Rafah offensive (see above).158 In May, 70% of likely voters supported a permanent ceasefire in Gaza.155 The most visible public form of dissent to date was a series of campus protests in American universities that peaked over April and May. These are described in more detail in the Zoom-in 2 section below.